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Abstract
This paper sets out to explore the relationships between institutional constraints and predictability in
geopolitical forecasting. Despite the increasing complexity of our world today, researchers have found
that institutional rules and norms still function to influence human behavior, and, therefore, the presence
of well-functioning institutions may lead to greater stability and certainty in predicting world events.
Using forecasting data from the Good Judgment Project’s recent prediction tournaments, we test the
change in predictability—including accuracy, confidence, and difficulty—against the experimental
constraints of diplomatic ties, rule of law, effective democracy, trade dependence, and freedom of the
press. Our hypothesis is that each of these institutions, together and in conjunction with one another, are
effectively able to constraint power player political behavior and reduce uncertainty in the geopolitical
realm.
We find that all of the constraints, except for diplomatic ties, actually have a negative correlation with
prediction accuracy. Democracy is the strongest negative correlation between the level of constraint and
prediction accuracy. We propose that one possible explanation for this result is due to a potential
quadratic relationship between democracy and predictability, such that countries who are transitioning
from autocracy actually become less predictable than those that are autocratic. Further research in a
larger sample set is needed to test this new hypothesis.
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Abstract
This paper sets out to explore the relationships between institutional constraints and
predictability in geopolitical forecasting. Despite the increasing complexity of our world
today, researchers have found that institutional rules and norms still function to influence
human behavior, and, therefore, the presence of well-functioning institutions may lead to
greater stability and certainty in predicting world events.
Using forecasting data from the Good Judgment Project’s recent prediction
tournaments, we test the change in predictability—including accuracy, confidence, and
difficulty—against the experimental constraints of diplomatic ties, rule of law, effective
democracy, trade dependence, and freedom of the press. Our hypothesis is that each of these
institutions, together and in conjunction with one another, are effectively able to constraint
power player political behavior and reduce uncertainty in the geopolitical realm
We find that all of the constraints, except for diplomatic ties, actually have a negative
correlation with prediction accuracy. Democracy is the strongest negative correlation
between the level of constraint and prediction accuracy. We propose that one possible
explanation for this result is due to a potential quadratic relationship between democracy
and predictability, such that countries who are transitioning from autocracy actually become
less predictable than those that are autocratic. Further research in a larger sample set is
needed to test this new hypothesis.
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Introduction to the Topic
We are living in the Information Age, characterized by a universal reliance on
research studies and immediate news coverage. Technology is providing humans with the
capability to overcome barriers of time, distance, location, and physical human capacities in
order to process information and make decisions. An increasing percentage of activity in the
developed world has shifted into the “knowledge economy” whereby production and service
offerings rely more heavily on intellectual capabilities than physical inputs or natural
resources. The ability to exploit what management gurus call “big data” has permeated the
way business, economic, and political strategists endeavor to accurately model the future
and pursue courses of action which are statistically most likely to provide a desirable
outcome.
Yet, across every academic discipline and economic sector, we continue to observe
significant error in predicting future states of the world. This trend even holds true for socalled experts who are hired on the basis of their ability to calculate potential opportunities
and threats. While some prediction errors are trivial in the grand scheme, many ensue
considerable financial losses to the hard-earned dollars of organizations, investors, and
taxpayers. Even graver are the human consequences that can result from forecasting failures,
such as consequences from unexpected political coups, ethnic genocides, market failures,
and natural disasters. More accurate prediction of geopolitical events such as these has the
potential to save not just money but also human livelihoods. Places which are the most
vulnerable to unpredictable circumstances seem to incur them the most often.
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Researchers have begun to explore what actually constitutes good judgment in
forecasting future events and why experts are often wrong in their forecasts. Four years ago,
with some of these questions still left unanswered, an experiment called the Good Judgment
Project set out with a mission to “harness the wisdom of the crowd to forecast world
events.”1 What could everyday people like you and me know about nuclear bombs and
economic downturns? It came as a shock to many that the average forecasts of amateur
individuals have been surprisingly accurate.

The Good Judgment Project
The Good Judgment Project (GJP) is a four-year research study begun in 2011 by
psychology and management professors Phillip Tetlock, author of the award-winning Expert
Political Judgment; Barb Mellers, an expert on judgment and decision-making; and Don
Moore, an expert on overconfidence. The GJP was supported by research teams at the
University of Pennsylvania and the University of California Berkeley including experts in
psychology, economics, and statistics.
The GJP was organized as part of a government forecasting tournament sponsored by
the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) division of the US Office of the
Director of National Intelligence. The specific tournament is IARPA’s Aggregative Contingent
Estimation Program (ACE), which aims "to dramatically enhance the accuracy, precision, and
timeliness of forecasts for a broad range of event types, through the development of

1

Tetlock, Phil, Barb Mellers, and Don Moore. "Welcome to the Good Judgment Project." The Good Judgment Project.
N.p., n.d. Web. 10 May 2015.
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advanced techniques that elicit, weight, and combine the judgments of many intelligence
analysts."2 In essence, the goal of this initiative was to source better ways of collecting and
manipulating raw forecast data to in order to ultimately improve the government’s
performance in geopolitical forecasting.
In 2011, the inaugural year of the ACE tournament, the GJP asked hundreds of people
to join its team and help predict the likelihood of a broad set of nearly 200 global events that
were of interest to the U.S. intelligence community. The GJP’s international group of
forecasters signed up voluntarily and represented a diverse range of careers, backgrounds,
and levels of expertise. The GJP beat out four other university-based groups in that year’s
tournament, taking the raw individual forecast data and using sophisticated aggregation
algorithms to combine them into the most accurate crowd-sourced forecasts possible. By the
end of the tournament’s second year, the GJP team had performed so well that it became the
only group to receive IARPA funding for the remainder of the ACE program.3
Each year, the GJP strives to improve its aggregate forecasts, implementing new
strategies including cognitive and psychological training and introducing knowledgesharing teams in addition to continually improving its algorithmic model. The successful
strategies of the GJP can and have been used by the US Intelligence Community to improve
the government’s ability to forecast global events. The massive quantities of prediction data

2

Rieber, Steve. "Aggregative Contingent Estimation (ACE)." Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA).
US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, n.d. Web. 10 May 2015.
3

“The Good Judgment Project: Improving Intelligence Estimates to Support Decision-makers." CHIPS Technology
Magazine. US Department of the Navy, Spring 2015. Web. 11 May 2015.
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collected by the GJP provide an unparalleled opportunity for deeper analysis on how we can
go about improving our country’s ability to forecast.

Motivation
The art and science of prediction are deeply nested in the fields of international
development and diplomatic relations. As a future professional within these disciplines, my
ability to rely on proven rational and statistical models to precisely anticipate future global
events will be critical to the success of any initiative I intend to pursue. The extent to which
global leaders are able to design effective solutions for political peace in Syria, adequate
health and sanitation in Bangladesh, and agricultural sustainability in Angola will depend
heavily on the predictions of geopolitical forecasters to inform the allocation of resources
and risks to where they might be most productive.
I believe that the findings from this study have great potential to inform the methods
and techniques that intelligence analysts will be taught to employ as they engage in the
formation of probabilities and conjectures regarding significant global events. More accurate
predictions from these experts will ultimately enable decision-makers from across all
sectors of society to make more efficient use of limited resources and become more effective
in safeguarding the lives and livelihoods of human persons.
We hypothesize that individuals who forecast on a regular basis as part of their
profession can be taught to make better predictions by improving their dissecting of
forecasting prompts—real or experimental. Historical analysis of past predictions enables
us to study where we have gone wrong (or right) and adjust our future strategy accordingly.
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The identification of relevant institutional protocols and normal which constrain geopolitical
outcomes is an important first step to understanding predictability. Essentially, if we can
uncover specific question tags including countries, regions, or question types or
combinations thereof which have seen statistically significant unpredictability, we should be
able to improve our strategy going forward.
By analyzing both the correlation and potential causation between a question
properties and the prediction quality of forecasters within the Good Judgment Project, we
might uncover previously unknown insights into the most effectual cognitive strategies for
achieving optimal results. If we succeed in our goal, we will be one step closer to the optimal
training frontier in preparing accurate forecasters of global events.
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Literature Overview
Making accurate predictions in a world of increasingly complex geopolitics is a skill
that brilliant minds from every academic discipline have sought to pinpoint. In particular,
political scientists and international relations theorists have endeavored for centuries to
explain the randomness of global events with a plethora of models, theories, and
frameworks. While they have greatly improved the human ability to understand and
articulate the complex nature of geopolitics, there has been little concrete progress in the
way of anticipating future world events.
A common answer to this unsolvable problem is that of complexity theory which
understands that processes having a large number of independent agents will interact and
order themselves spontaneously into a coherent and stable system of behavior. Complexity
theory which suggests that “organizations” (such as the sphere of international politics in
the case of this paper) cannot be conceptualized in a linear or additive frame of mind. Instead,
numerous experts agree that complex structures must be understood as both dynamic and
adaptive. The theory also implies that such complex behavior is for the most part
unpredictable and uncontrollable. The rapid pace of communication and evolving
technologies today only serves to further entangle the interconnected web of actors within
a constantly-changing global system.
Political scientist Stanley Feder suggests that creating prediction models, however
nonlinear and intricate, still cannot replace what is to be learned by real-world experience
in political science: “Analytical methods alone will not guarantee that policy makers and
academics will not be surprised by political events. Preventing surprise depends on asking
10

the right questions.”4 Feder argues that the basic value of a geopolitical forecasting lies in
preventing surprises as opposed to attempting to pinpoint certainty, which is both futile and
counter-productive. One can and should prevent surprises by becoming familiar with each
of the moving parts in a complex system and understanding the norms of how a change in
one influences a change in another, rather than attempting to predict the aggregate outcome
of so many individual actions and motivations.
In geopolitics, these moving parts are often understood to be a wide range of relevant
actors, from heads of state, to the military, to businessmen, to leaders of diplomatic entities.
Our standard definition of complexity theory would seem to suggest that rather than having
all of the power in the hands of a single actor, increasing the number of stakeholders
interacting in a given situation will disperse the base of power, ultimately resulting in greater
political stability. According to the international politics researcher Neil E. Harrison,
decentralized decision-making further increases complexity. In his book Complexity in World
Politics, Harrison writes that “complexity views politics as emerging from interactions
among interdependent but individual agents within evolving institutional frameworks.” 5
The idea of institutions providing some guiding structure to the chaotic world of
complexity theory is important to social science theory. Douglas North, a Nobel Prizewinning economist from the New Institutional Economics (NIE) school, defines institutions
as the “the rules of the game” of a given society which are humanly-devised and govern

4

Feder, Stanley A. "FORECASTING FOR POLICY MAKING IN THE POST–COLD WAR PERIOD."
Web of Science. Web. 1 May 2015.
5

5 (2002): 111-25.

Harrison, Neil E. Complexity in World Politics: Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm. Albany: State U of New
York, 2006. Print.
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human interaction. Institutions can include both formal constraints such as statue law,
common law, regulation as well as informal constraints including conventions, norms of
behavior, and self-imposed codes of conduct.6 Arguing for the theory of institutional realism,
political scientist Robert Graftstein proposes that individuals actively choose to participate
in pre-existing institutions which reduce uncertainty and transaction costs.
While the various theories regarding institutions (historicism, realism, etc.) have
been widely discussed and debated in political science literature, current scholarship has not
yet closed the gap to approaching a clear and comprehensive understanding of how the rules
and norms provided by institutions can play a role in increasing predictability. These
institutional “constraints” as North defined then seen to follow Feder’s notion of forecasting
not as an exercise to pre-determine the outcome, but rather understanding what norms do
exist amidst the complexity that are likely to influence its behavior in a certain way. Thus
strong institutions with programmed patterns of behavior may be able to serve as
instruments of prediction in an otherwise complex system.
In the case of geopolitical forecasting, it is common to think of domineering political
power players who make bold actions facing little to no constraint on their authority.
Complexity theory suggests that the more actors who are involved in sharing authority with
these power players will tend the collective outcome toward a “coherent and stable” system
of behavior. Strong macro-level institutions can perhaps be those actors who not only
disperse power away from a concentrated source but who also incorporate constraints in

6

North, Douglass. "The New Institutional Economics and Development." Washington University St. Louis (1993): n.
pag. Print.
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the form of laws and norms on a power player’s otherwise rogue behavior and bring an
entire community toward a more predictable outcome.
A wealth of research describes the nature of specific political and social institutions
and how each operates through a combination of formal and informal norms to influence
human behavior and interaction. A detailed analysis of the each of these types of institutions
and their relative effectiveness is beyond the scope of this paper. We identified five wellresearched global institutions which we intuitively believe may be capable of constraining
power players from igniting geopolitical stress, either actively (invading a neighbor’s
border) or passively (not controlling the growth of insurgency). If the institutions we have
chosen to test fulfill their duty as effective constraints, geopolitical forecasting will become
much more predictable in their presence.
The first experimental constraint, diplomatic ties, reflects research suggesting that
international organizations can serve either a coercive or a support role for individual
countries, as long as they comply with rigorous standards. The second, rule of law, consider
studies which contrast corrupt and unjust legal institutions with those that are strictly bound
to treat all men and women equal under the law. The third, effective democracy, implies
the (historically-proven) potential for protest, impeachment, or even revolution in the even
that a leader is acting in the explicit interests of the people. Fourth, trade dependence,
echoes an ever-widening body of research suggesting that countries who rely almost
exclusively on other nations for their revenues may be economically forced to enter into
certain relationships. Finally, freedom of the press alludes to the widespread reputational
damage which can quickly occur if a leader acts in a way that others, even small social groups,
deem to be unfavorable.
13

Research Methodology
In brief, this paper will utilize linear regression methods to analyze numerical and
descriptive data from the Good Judgment Project forecasting records, testing for
relationships between observed levels of predictability and details of question content (both
direct and indirect). Specifically, this paper endeavors to answer the following question:

Are there certain institutions which are able to consistently constrain the
agency of a power player into a more predictable pattern?
A more detailed description of research methodology follows in the subsections below.

Sample of Observation
The majority of the data to be studied in this analysis come directly from the Good
Judgment Project records itself. The Good Judgment Project question database and
forecasting results is a place where we can begin to generate hypotheses about
predictability. Given the wealth of data we have available, it should be very worthwhile to
compare the questions forecasters predict well with those they predict poorly. Specifically,
this paper will observe forecasting questions which “closed” during Year 3 of the GJP,
conducted from August 2013 to May 2014. (All questions run for a pre-specified time frame,
after which the final predictions of each forecaster will be scored.) Extreme outlier questions
which were removed from analyses conducted by the GJP research team were also take out
of this data set. Furthermore, due to the research method chosen for this paper, questions
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which did not identify one or two primary countries as subjects in the prompt were also
eliminated. These initial data-cleaning measures left a sample of approximately 130
questions to test.
Each of these questions were identified by direct characteristics (country actor and
question family) as well as indirect characteristics (relevant institutions). These descriptive
measures formed the independent variables for these regressions. The dependent variable
was determined to be observed predictability, based on forecaster performance in our
sample set of GJP questions. We created three distinct measures of predictability (difficulty,
confidence, and accuracy) to be tested in these regressions. The analysis will be primarily
driven by a simple one-by-one linear regression of each of the dependent variables—
difficulty, confidence, and accuracy—on each of the independent variables—country actor,
question family, and institutional constraint and interpreting the results.

Prediction Data
Before discussing the formulation of variables, it is important to understand how
predictions are actually submitted to the tournament. Almost all forecasting questions are
created to be binary, such that one answer is correct and one answer is incorrect and there
is no room for ambiguity in between. The questions are constructed around a specific time
frame in the real world; whether the hypothetical event does or does not happen by a
specifically identified date, will determine the outcome of the question, and thus whether an
individual forecast is correct or incorrect.
While the questions are binary, the responses are more flexible. Forecasters are
invited to submit a probability percentage ranging from 0% to 100% for each event which
15

they are predicting. For example, if I am certain that an event will occur, I will answer 100%;
if I am less certain, but still fairly confident, I might answer 80%. If I am completely clueless,
I would consider answering 50% as it sits perfectly in the middle of a yes or no response.
When scores are calculated to assess how correct the predictions were, there is a function
that considers not only if a forecaster was on the correct side of 50% but also how far from
100% or 0% his or her prediction was.
It is also important to take into consideration that, in this tournament, predictions on
a single question are made over a long time horizon, with a possibility to change your
prediction during the duration of the question. Unlike the expert difficulty measurement
which must be taken ex ante, measurements which are derived from an individual’s forecast
can be seen as flow variables rather than stock variables. Typically in the GJP, variables such
as these are reported as longitudinal weighted averages. (For example, if I score a 1 for 50%
of the duration of the question, 0.5 for 25% and 0.25 for the remaining 25%, my overall
reported score on this variable would be 1*0.5 + 0.5*0.25 + 0.25*0.25 = 68.75). Moreover,
there are over 1000 forecasters in Year 3 of the tournament, a large sample which—in the
spirit of the “wisdom of the crowds” theory—affords the opportunity for us to average the
individual forecasting variables that correspond with each question for a more robust
indicator of overall trends occurring.

Dependent Variables
Our research intends to test and compare the level of predictability of different postmortem geopolitical forecasting questions in order to develop new insights regarding the
anticipatory prediction of global events in the real world. The notion of predictability is
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generally understood as the degree to which a correct prediction or forecast of a system's
state can be made either qualitatively or quantitatively; however, it is a complex idea that is
actually quite hard to conceptualize and thus to concisely articulate. Precisely for this reason,
we have chosen to identify and test three distinct notions of predictability—difficulty,
confidence, and accuracy—to assess the phenomenon of predictability more carefully.
The variable of question difficulty aims to pinpoint how easy or hard a certain
question is to predict, assuming a forecaster has all of the relevant information. These ratings
of question difficulty are collected from subject-matter experts who place each question on
a seven-point scale ranging from most to least difficult to accurately predict. The measure
we will formulate for expert difficulty will be a mean of all expert difficulty ratings assigned
to a certain question. Here high values (7) will denote that the question is easy and low values
(1) that it is difficult. The rating task is done ex ante to avoid hindsight bias; however, this
makes the rating task particularly challenging because, in effect, we are asking experts to
predict unpredictability.
Following this logic, the variable of forecaster confidence intends to understand with
how much certainty each prediction was made. Like predictability, the qualitative notion of
confidence can take on a number of nuanced quantitative meanings. For the purposes of this
analysis, we chose to create a scaled confidence index which would incorporate the
statistical measures of extremity, entropy, and variance. For each of these variables (as
stated in the paragraph above), we will take the weighted mean across all days the question
is open and standardize it such that the variables have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation
of 1. From these values, we create the confidence composite variable which is calculated as
follows: scaled confidence index = mean extremeness – mean entropy – mean variance.
17

Extremeness is an evaluation of the distance of one’s prediction from 50%. If a
forecaster predicts a 0% or 100% outcome, it can be assumed that the individual is quite
confident in the outcome he or she has chosen, whereas a 50% prediction implies maximum
uncertainty. High variance among the entire pool of forecasters denotes a lack of collective
confidence, while low variance suggests that the majority of forecasters are in relative
agreement. Finally, statistical entropy measures the dispersion of forecasters along the
range of 0% to 100% outcomes. Entropy is highly correlated with variance, but rather than
considering the range between forecasters (as variance does), entropy considers the location
of dense pockets of similar predictions or very sparse ranges of very few predictions as a
distinct way of assessing uncertainty. Because extremeness is an indication of confidence,
and variance and entropy suggest a lack of confidence, the index measure has been
formulated to subtract standardized variance and entropy values from the standardized
extremeness value—a high index value represents confidence.
The final, and perhaps most intuitive, approach to assessing predictability is
considering the accuracy of geopolitical forecasters in answering each question correctly.
As mentioned previously, the forecaster’s score for each question awarded on the basis of
“ending up on the right side of 50” as well as the certainty of each prediction. For example, if
an event occurs, and my prediction was 100%, I will get the maximum score for that
individual question. The technique used to make this method of assessment work is called a
Brier Score, a measure which includes both an assessment for the correct outcome (i.e. +/0.5 for a binary question) and certainty or that outcome (i.e. distance from 0.5) and then
taking a weighted average of a single individual’s predictions across the duration of the
question in case the predictor chose to update along the way, as most do.
18

The Brier Score traditionally reports a 0 as the best score and 1s and 2s to be very
poor showings, so for the sake of consistency with other dependent variables, we will use
the reverse of the Brier Score for the purposes of this analysis. The reason that accuracy
cannot be our only measure of predictability is because the use of Brier Score as the
dependent variable limits our analysis to only post-mortem evaluations, given that one
cannot calculate the Brier Score until after the time frame for the question closes.
Predictability, however, is a relevant factor before the outcome of a question is known; this
understanding is captured by the previous measure of confidence. Moreover, Brier Score is
not a perfect predictive mechanism for understanding real world geopolitical conclusions
because the Brier scoring treats errors of under- and over-prediction as equally bad.

Independent Variables
The direct independent variable which is easiest to identify is “country actor.” All of the
forecasting questions which were left in our data set after its initial cleaning had one or two
countries identified in the context of the prompt. In the case of two country actors (e.g. Will
Iran and Russia *officially sign an agreement regarding the exchange of oil for goods and
services before 10 May 2014?), we originally set out to repeat the question twice in our data
set—once with each country as the primary actor. Doubling the presence of certain
questions, however, created misleading results in the data, so instead we chose to identify
the “least constrained” country as the primary actor (more explanation to follow on
constraints below). After identifying the country actor in each question, we also assigned
each question to one of the following seven regions: North America, Latin America, Europe,
Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast & East Asia.
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The second direct variable we created, “question family,” was more subjective to
identify. The GJP questions in our records had already been (subjectively) tagged with one
of 18 question groupings, but this would have proven too granular for our small group of
130 observations. After carefully studying all of the questions in our data set, the following
families were identified as mutually exclusive and collective exhaustive: conflict, domestic,
economic, negotiation, and leader change. A number of the old question groupings were
channeled directly into one larger question family (e.g. all questions previously identified as
“Elections” or “Leader Entry/Exit” both became identified as “Leader Change” in the new
family scheme.)
Conflict questions included the subjects of war, border aggression, deployment of troops,
short-term ceasefire agreements, and nuclear threats. Domestic questions referenced local
policy and legislative concerns, internal country factions and insurgency, national
emergencies, and human rights issues including disease and refugees. Economic questions
explored trade agreements, monetary policy, sovereign debt, interest rates, and commodity
markets. Negotiation questions referenced international agreements, treaties, sanctions, and
long-term peace talks. Finally, leader change questions included the topics of election
fairness and results, political coups, and the removing or vacating of office for any reason.
The final independent variable is an indirect measure called an “institutional
constraint” and is the primary measure that will be used to test our research question. The
following section will describe the intuition and construction behind the creation of this
unique variable.

20

Identifying Constraints
Following our review of the literature, we hypothesize that each of the following
institutions may have the influence to limit the power of a given political actor and thus
reduce the scope of acceptable choices and corresponding outcomes for his/her action:
diplomatic ties, rule of law, effective democracy, trade dependence, & press freedom. By
limiting the range of viable outcomes in a given geopolitical scenario, these institutions act
as constraints on the behavior of a single powerful actor (in our analysis here, we identify
the country itself as this actor). The presence of these classified institutional constraints
(both independently and in conjunction with one another) we hypothesize will ultimately
decrease the level of unpredictability for a given geopolitical outcome.
In order to scientifically evaluate how these proposed constraints can impact
geopolitical predictability, it is critical that we measure these constraints as thoughtfully,
systematically, and objectively as possible. For this reason, all constraints will be fit to a 0100 scale in order to standardize values for the purpose of statistical analysis. We have also
chosen to assign the relevant level of institutional constraint to the current political
dynamics of each country (that is, to our primary actor in the geopolitical scenario). It is
critical that each relevant constraint be linked to the country in question rather than the
question itself because our hypothesis assumes a change in the power held by a country’s
predominant political actor as civic institutions grow stronger and begin to disperse power
away from the government. Our choice to organize data in this way also leaves our analysis
open to the (likely) possibility that the central political figure or national regime of a
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particular country changes; by assigning the institutional constraint index to a country, new
leaders will not be misrepresented by the qualities of their predecessor.

Five Institutional Constraints
Diplomatic ties or diplomacy act as a constraint on political power when
international pressures place limits on local or national sovereignty. We measure this
constraint using data from the Center for Systemic Peace and its Integrated Network for
Societal Conflict Research (INSCR). The index is constructed based on the following data:
Memberships in Conventional Intergovernmental Organizations (CIO),
country data coded every fifth year, 1952-1997, denotes individual country
membership in a) federations of inter-government organizations (1); b)
universal membership organizations (39); c) inter-continental membership
organizations (52); and d) regionally-defined membership organizations
(288);

characterized

by

“autonomous

international

governmental

organizations of a non-profit nature”7
This index has not been updated since 1997, however, it still should represent a useful tool
for our analysis. There has been relatively little fluctuation in relevant IGO membership over
the course of the past 20 years given that the major organizations were created much earlier
in the 20th century.
The rule of law acts as a constraint on political power because it constitutes a civil
order, strong legal enforcement, and just prosecution. We measure this constraint using the

7

"Memberships in Conventional Intergovernmental Organizations." Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research
(INSCR). Center for Systemic Peace, n.d. Web. 1 May 2015.
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Rule of Law index created by the World Justice Project. The index is constructed based on
the following data:
The WJP Rule of Law Index offers a detailed, multidimensional view of the
extent to which countries adhere to the rule of law in practice. The Index
measures the rule of law using 47 indicators organized around 8 themes:
constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open government,
fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice,
and criminal justice.8
Unfortunately, this index is an incomplete indicator because it only includes data analysis
compiled for 99 countries. A number of nations that are frequently identified as subjects in
geopolitical forecasting questions (including Syria, North Korea, and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo) are not evaluated or assigned a Rule of Law ranking by this index.
Other potential rule of law indices we considered utilizing (but that were not as robust as
the WJP) had identified all three of these countries near the very bottom of their lists, so we
have taken the liberty of assigning these three nations each with an approximate rule of law
score of 30, which is near the bottom of the range for this index.
Independently from the rule of law, effective democracy can also act as a constraint
on political power because it evokes unrestrained participation and agency expressed by the
citizenry. We will measure this constraint using the Democracy index created by The
Economist. The index is constructed based on the following data:
The Democracy Index is based on five categories: electoral process and
pluralism;

civil

liberties;

the

functioning of

government;

political

participation; and political culture. Based on their scores on a range of

8
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indicators within these categories, each country is then categorized as one of
four types of regime: “full democracies”; “flawed democracies”; “hybrid
regimes”; and “authoritarian regimes.”9
This data set is complete, robust, and up to date.
Meanwhile in the economic sphere, trade dependence serves as a constraint on
political power to the extent of the international goods and commodities trade across
countries. We will measure this constraint using the Merchandise Trade as a percentage (%)
of GDP index source from the World Bank. The index is constructed based on the following:
Merchandise trade as a share of GDP is the sum of merchandise exports and
imports divided by the value of GDP, all in current U.S. dollars. Merchandise
trade only includes trade in goods, not services nor capital transfers and
foreign investments.10
This data set is complete, robust, and up to date. In some instances 2014 data was not
available, so we inserted 2013 numbers as a close approximation.
Finally, we include freedom of the press as a constraint on political power which can
be assessed by the extent, accuracy, and honesty of local media and reporting coverage. We
will measure this constraint using the World Press Freedom index created by the Reporters
Without Borders. The index is constructed based on the following data:
The Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index ranks the
performance of 180 countries according to a range of criteria that include
media pluralism and independence, respect for the safety and freedom of

9

"Democracy Index 2013." Economist Intelligence Unit. The Economist, n.d. Web. 1 May 2015.

10

World Bank. Data Catalog: World Development Indicators. Merchandise Trade as a share of GDP. From WB National
Accounts Data and OECD National Accounts Data. N.p., 2014. Web. 1 May 2015.
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journalists, and the legislative, institutional and infrastructural environment
in which the media operate.11
This data set is also complete, robust, and up to date.
We can imagine other “institutions” which might act as constraining factors on the
range of acceptable political activity as well. For example, reliance on foreign aid, religious
homogeneity, and progressive social values can undoubtedly limit the agency of individual
political leaders to act completely freely. For the purposes of this analysis, however, we chose
to focus on constraints that are characterized by institutions which are likely to share the
same realm of political power with the country’s Head of State, or another lead national
actor. Each of these institutions identified above would be considered legitimate civic actors
which can have a broad impact reaching nearly all citizens, if the institution is strong.
Practice examples of these for each identified constraint might be the United Nations, the
judiciary system, the electoral system, capitalist market forces, the popular press.

Applying Constraint Weights
Yet, while it logically follows to assign these constraint indices to each individual
country, we need to still take into account the content of the question itself in evaluating a
certain event’s predictability. Different institutional constraints will not necessarily apply
equally to different questions. For example, for a question regarding a possible upcoming
election, the level of effective democracy in a country is going to be a much more relevant
potential constraint than the level of trade dependence.

11

"World Press Freedom Index 2014." Reporters Without Borders. N.p., n.d. Web. 1 May 2015.
25

Table 1: Summary of Institutional Constraints and Accompanying Indices

INSTITUTION

COUNTRY INDEX

Diplomatic Ties

Conventional IGO Membership
(Center for Systemic Peace)

Rule of Law

Rule of Law Index
(World Justice Project)

Effective Democracy

Democracy Index
(The Economist)

Trade Dependence

Merchandise Trade as % of GDP
(World Bank)

Press Freedom

World Press Freedom Index
(Reporters without Borders)

To this end, we chose to create an additional variable which attempts to quantify the
qualitative traits of the content in each particular forecasting question for the purposes of
our analysis. Essentially, this variable will act as a multiplier to ensure that the constraints
relevant to each question are given enough weight in determining predictability, while those
that are not particularly relevant are not overemphasized.
We call this variable question relevance, and it will be decidedly orthogonal to the
country-linked institutional constraint variables described in the previous section. In
practice, this means the relevance of each identified constraint is assessed independently of
the country in question (i.e. as if the country name was not given). The most systematic way
to accomplish this goal will be to automatically assign quantitative question relevance values
based on the previously referenced qualitative question family variable, thus avoiding a
more haphazard approach to assigning relevance based on each individual question.
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Table 2: Institutional Constraint Weightings Assigned by Question Family
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
QUESTION
FAMILIES

DIPLM

RULAW

DEMOC

TRADE

PRESS

Conflict

2.0

1.5

2.0

1.5

1.5

Domestic

1.5

2.0

2.0

1.5

2.0

Economic

1.5

1.0

1.0

2.0

1.0

Negotiation

2.0

1.5

1.0

1.5

1.5

Leader Change

1.0

2.0

2.0

1.5

1.5

The weighting will be assigned on a three-point scale. A “1.0” will indicate that a
forecasting question’s outcome will not likely be influenced by this constraint. A “1.5” will
indicate that a forecasting question’s outcome is likely to be influence by this constraint. A
“2.0” will indicate that a forecasting question’s outcome will be significantly influenced by
this constraint. Essentially, we are aiming to determine to what extent this constraint
actually affects this type of question. The following example question illustrates why this
weighting is necessary for our analysis: Will inflation in Japan reach 2 percent at any point before
1 April 2014? For a prompt like this which falls in the Economics question family, it is easy to see that
Press Freedom is unlikely to be an influential constraint for this question. On the flip side, Trade
Dependence will be a significant constraint in questions that determine the future of Japan’s
economy. By assigning these weights to each constraint, we are strengthening the robustness of our
analysis to test for correlation between institutional constraints and predictability.
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We will summarize our full variable methodology in the following example forecasting
question, illustrated by the inset to the right. After isolating each question, we identify the primary
actor country (and associated region) and then

Will there be a significant lethal confrontation
between armed forces from Russia and
Ukraine in Crimea before 1 April 2014?

sort each question into one of five question
families. From there, we refer to our external
indices such as the Economist Democracy
Index to determine the country actor’s score
on each of the five institutional constraints we
are testing (all scores are scaled from 0-100).
Finally, we multiply each located constraint
value with the appropriate weighting based on
its question family. This final weighted value,
which you see on the far right of the table, will
be our primary independent variable in this
analysis.

Limitations of Investigation
This investigation faces one important potential limitation in that the amount of data
observations to be used in conducting this analysis is limited by the quantity of forecasts
conducted by the Good Judgment Project. With a smaller sample size, correlations must be
particularly high in order to be statistically significant. This also means that the potential
relationships identified as a part of this analysis may be essentially false positives when
considered outside the scope of this data set. With this limitation in mind, the GJP and I
recommend that the results to be discussed in the following section be understood as
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correlations recognized within the GJP-specific context that provide a starting point for
forecasting hypotheses which can later be tested in the broader field of political science with
a larger scale and scope of data collection.
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Statistical Results
The initial analysis tested for predictability—difficulty, confidence, and accuracy—
against the weighted institutional constraint variables designed for this analysis. Our
institutional constraint variables turn out to be poor predictors of prediction difficulty
(measured by the expert difficulty rating) and prediction confidence (measured by a
composite variable of forecaster extremeness, variance, and entropy). Out of our three
dependent variables, prediction accuracy (measured by the Brier Score indicator) turned out
to be much more highly correlated to weighted institutional constraints on average.
In contrast with our hypothesis, however, the overall effect was found to be negative
rather than positive. In other words, while our initial assumption was that the presence of
these institutions would constrain political actors and thus make forecasting questions more
predictable, our data suggest instead that the more institutionally constrained a question is,
the less likely it is to be predictable. The sum of all weighted constraint values (“total”)
showed a small correlation with accuracy (r =-0.15, t(110)=-1.80, p=0.07). In fact, with
varying strengths of correlation, all of the constraint variables we tested were negatively
associated with accuracy, except for diplomacy which was observed to have a slight positive
correlation with accuracy. The strongest of these negative correlations was for democracy (r
=-0.19, t(110)=-2.00, p=0.05), suggesting that as the level of democracy in a country
increases, forecasters have an increasingly hard time make accurate predictions.
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Table 3: Statistical Output of Predictability Measures against Institutional Constraints
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Focus on Accuracy
These findings that contradicted our initial hypothesis led us to look deeper into the
relationship between prediction accuracy and weighted institutional constraints. Our
additional independent variables of geographic region and question family offered an
opportunity to subset the data to observe the correlations between accuracy and
institutional constraint more closely.
The correlations become larger and more significant when looking at smaller subsets
of data. When looking across geographies, we see that within the subset region of Southeast
and East Asia—which includes numerous questions on China, Japan, the Koreas, Thailand,
and Myanmar—there is a fairly strong negative correlation between prediction accuracy and
the “total” existence of institutional constraints (r =-0.34, t(32)=-2.08, p=0.05), observing a
particularly significant relationship with democracy (r =-0.36, t(32)=-2.19, p=0.04),

Table 3: Statistical Output of Accuracy against Institutional Constraints by Region Subset

We can also analyze the correlations subdivided by question family. The most
significant results from this analysis are located within the domestic question family, which
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again include the topics of local policy and legislative concerns, internal country factions and
insurgency, national emergencies, and human rights issues including disease and refugees.
Within this question family, there is a statistically significant negative correlation between
prediction accuracy and the “total” existence of institutional constraints (r =-0.38, t(32)=2.30, p=0.03) as well as with the rule of law constraint in particular (r =-0.41, t(27)=-2.36,
p=0.03). This breakdown suggests that domestic question accuracy tends to be negatively
correlated with the presence of institutional constraints, whereas economic question
accuracy is positively correlated with the presence of institutional constraints.
Table 4: Statistical Output of Accuracy against Institutional Constraints by Family Subset

As an aside, the output in Table 4 above also calls attention to the potential for
positive correlation between rule of law and democracy, which indeed does exist very
strongly (r =0.83, t(95)=14.70, p<2.2e-16). While these two indices appear to be somewhat
redundant, a deeper look into the data confirms the relevance of keeping them both as
separate constraints. After each institutional constraint index is adjusted such that it scales
from 0-100, we observe that some nations like Iran have a much higher rule of law than
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democracy score (44.34 vs. 19.80 respectively) whereas countries like India have a much
lower rule of law than democracy score (47.71 vs. 79.20 respectively). Once again, the
democracy constraint seems to create a lot of questions within this analysis, thus we dedicate
the following section to the exploration of democracy as an institutional constraint and a
potential agent for geopolitical predictability.

The Democracy Question
The significant negative correlation between institutional constraints (particularly
democracy) and prediction accuracy was a surprising finding which deserves more in-depth
analysis. Rather than trying to deduce conclusions from statistical analysis, the method of
inductive reasoning may provide a better window into helping us understand this somewhat
counter-intuitive result. As the initial goal of this study was to identify the content qualities
which made certain questions more predictable than others, we return to conduct an
inductive analysis on the questions themselves.
We being looking at the five highest accuracy questions in the data set:
1. Before 1 May 2014, will Iran abolish the office of President of the Islamic Republic?
2. Before 1 May 2014, will General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi announce that he plans to stand
as a candidate in Egypt's next presidential election?
3. Will Syria's *mustard agent and key binary chemical weapon components be
destroyed on or before the 31 March 2014 deadline established by the Executive
Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)?
4. Before 1 May 2014, will China *attempt to seize control of Zhongye Island?
5. Will the six-party talks with North Korea resume before 1 May 2014?
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The prompts come from a wide variety of question families, but we observe that all five of
them are housed in the geographic regions of the Middle East or Southeast / East Asia. Most
of these countries (North Korea, Syria, Iran, etc.) are actually highly unstable which seems to
follow from our preliminary finding that institutional constraints and prediction accuracy
are negatively correlated.
Next, we select on the dependent variable for all questions which have a reverse Brier
Score (accuracy measure) of >0.998 to obtain a slightly larger sample of the 17 most
accurately predicted questions in our data set. This subset is likely too small and too biased
to interpret any results as statistically significant; nevertheless it could be a useful tool for
dissecting the data further. We run the initial thread of analysis exploring the relationship
between prediction accuracy and “total” institutional constraints and find that, indeed, the
negative correlation is even stronger between the two within this subset (r =0-.45, t(16)=2.02, p=.06), further reinforcing our initial result.
We do the same with the five lowest accuracy questions in the data set:
1. Before 1 January 2014, will the Prime Minister of Japan visit the Yasukuni Shrine?
2. Will Viktor Yanukovich vacate the office of President of Ukraine before 10 May 2014?
3. Before 1 May 2014, will Chinese armed forces or maritime law enforcement forces
attempt to interdict ... vessel or airplane that it claims is in its territorial
waters or airspace?
4. Which of the following will occur first with regard to the state of emergency declared
by the government of Thailand on 21 January 2014?
5. Which party will win the largest number of seats in the next elections for Colombia's
Chamber of Representatives?
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This time a number of geographic regions are represented, but there is a potential pattern in
the question families, with two prompts falling in the domestic category and two in the
leader change category,
Next, we select for all questions which have a reverse Brier Score <0.75 to again
obtain a sample of the 17 least accurately predicted questions in our data set. With an even
stronger result in this subset relative to the previous one, the negative correlation between
accuracy and “total” institutional constraints is observed (r =-0.52, t(16)=-2.44, p=.03).
Moreover, among the subset of least accurately predicted questions, the constraints of rule
of law and democracy present a particularly strong negative correlation—(r =-0.71, t(12)=3.47, p=.005) and (r =-0.57, t(16)=-2.76, p=.01) respectively. Acknowledging that this final
step of analysis is both biased from selecting on the dependent variable and limited due to
its very small sample size, it is safe to say that this investigation may contribute some
additional strength to our original surprising result that the presence of institutional
constraints, and democracy, in particular, make it harder for forecasters to accurately
predict future geopolitical events.

Summary of Findings
This research project was focused on identifying patterns based on the content
characteristics of geopolitical forecasting questions that may make them more predictable
for geopolitical forecasters (both amateur and professional) in the future. The goal of this
study was to generate hypotheses within the realm of forecasting data that could possibly
form the basis for future political science theories.
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The most noteworthy finding from this study is that the presence of institutional
constraints is negatively associated with prediction accuracy. Diplomacy was the only
constraint tested which seemed positively correlated with accuracy, suggesting that perhaps
political actors in countries which are party to numerous international treaties (as this
metric tests) do actually feel a restriction in their ability to pursue “unpredictable outcomes.”
All other constraints tested were negatively correlated with prediction accuracy across a
number of different statistical analyses run. The particularly strong negative relationship
between democracy and predictability offers a hypothesis for further research in the future.
Lastly, prompts located in the region of Southeast and East Asia and the question
family of “domestic” were seen as fairly unpredictable relative to other question in this data
set, so future forecasters would do well to note this observation and consider exercising
greater caution on prediction questions which include these two categorizations.
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Possible Interpretation
Can democracy really make things less predictable? This is a question to be answered
by a future paper. Nonetheless, our data from this study allow us to make a brief conjecture
regarding this initially surprising finding. We begin by reviewing our chosen indicator for
this particular institutional constraint—The Democracy Index, created by the Economist
Intelligence Unit—which incorporates an assessment of a country’s electoral process and
pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation, and political
culture.12 Why would a country that scores higher on these factors be subject to so much
unpredictability?

Table 5: The Economic Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2013

The Democracy Index --- Highest / Lowest States of Democracy

12

Norway

99.3

North Korea

10.8

Sweden

97.3

Central African Republic

14.9

Iceland

95.8

Chad

15.0

New Zealand

92.6

Equatorial Guinea

16.6

Denmark

91.1

Syria

17.4

Switzerland

90.9

Dem. Rep. of the Congo

17.5

Canada

90.8

Saudi Arabia

18.2

Finland

90.3

Turkmenistan

18.3

Australia

90.1

Guinea-Bissau

19.3

The Netherlands

89.2

Iran

19.8

Democracy Index
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A potential explanation lies in the nature of the forecasting tournament data itself.
Prediction prompts, which are designed to be challenging, are much less likely to include
countries like Norway and Canada (which are highly democratic) as they are to include North
Korea and Syria (which are highly undemocratic). In fact, the average democracy score
across all 167 countries surveyed was 55.5 (after our scaling mechanism from 0-100), but
the average unweighted country democracy score assigned to all questions in our data set
(n=129) was 44.3. This reference point suggests that the most democratic countries tend to
be underrepresented in forecasting tournament data.
Looking back on our inductive analysis of the most and least predictable questions,
we see evidence to suggest that questions referencing the least democratic countries (North
Korea, Syria, Iran, etc.) are surprisingly well-predicted by forecasters. Questions that are
most poorly predicted, on the other hand, seem to fall in the middle ranges of the Democracy
Index—again, according to our previous inductive analysis, these would be nations like
Colombia, Thailand, and the Ukraine. All of these data points begin to build a hypothesis that
perhaps it is not the most democratic countries that are the least predictable, but rather the
most democratic countries in our forecasting data set which actually represent more a
middle-democracy group of countries than one that is truly high-democracy countries.
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This hypothesis is reminiscent of an economics model known as the Kuznets curve.
In his landmark 1955 paper, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, Nobel laureate Simon
Kuznets introduced a theory that while poor societies start off relatively equal, as their
economies grow, they are subject to

Image 1: An illustration of the Kuznet’s Curve

increasing

inequality

as

employment

models shift to adjust to changing external
circumstances such as industrialization.
Eventually, however, as the economy
develops further, this inequality is reduced
again, as the market adjusts to its new
normal standard of activity. 13
The resemblance between this phenomenon and that which we experience in our
own data set—namely, that both the most and least democratic states appear to be the most
predictable—implies that there may perhaps be a similar quadratic equation that could help
explain the relationship between relative levels of state democracy and the predictability of
geopolitical events. We will test this postulate by fitting the Brier score (not reversed)
prediction accuracy measure of against the level of (unweighted) national democracy as
determined by the index. Each individual question will serve as a unique data point.
After plotting all of the data points and fitting a quadratic polynomial to the
observations, we detect that there may indeed be a curvilinear relationship between

13

Kuznets, Simon. "Economic Growth and Income Inequality." American Economic Review 45.1 (1955): 1-28. JSTOR.
Web. 01 May 2015.
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predictability and democracy as follows from the similar economic model planted by
Kuznets in 1955. In our limited data set, however, the relationship is weak (R² = 0.0254, y =
-8E-05x2 +0.0089x - 0.0568), and there are likely to be many other factors which play a role.
It is worth noting that forecasting data is intended to be non-linear, or even, in this case, nonquadratic, as the goal of these tournaments is to pose distinctly unpredictable questions to
the participants. Thus, even a small observed relationship such as this one could warrant a
very interesting and explanatory study when real world data is incorporated.
Image 2: Geopolitical unpredictability as a function of national democracy levels

In closing, I suggest that more research be done on the evolution of democracy in
emerging political powers and how this progression could perhaps be a source of local
instability and thus geopolitical unpredictability. The idea of a turbulent democracy in
transition has been promoted by many scholars, including Edward Mansfield and Jack
Snyder who assert that in such nations “mass politics mixes with authoritarian elite politics
in a volatile way” that can lead to wars, aggression, and other negative political
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consequences.14 Such a hypothesis would also fits our data results in this paper suggesting
that questions falling within the “domestic” family are among the least predictable along with
questions located on Asian nations like China and Thailand—both of which are frequently
referenced as countries undergoing a (long) process of democratization. Among the BRICS
and MINT countries, which are generally cited as nations undergoing serious economic
transition, we observe from the graph below that each of them is situated somewhere along
the process of democratization as well—a condition which may perhaps be a contributing
factor in their frequent mention in geopolitical news.

Image 2: States in economic transition as a function of national democracy levels

14

Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. "Democratization and the Danger of War." International Security 20.1
(1995): 5. Harvard University. Web. 1 May 2015.
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Conclusion
Summary of Paper
This paper set out to explore the relationships between institutional constraints and
predictability in geopolitical forecasting. Despite the increasing complexity of our world
today, researchers have found that institutional rules and norms still function to influence
human behavior, and, therefore, the presence of well-functioning institutions may lead to
greater stability and certainty in predicting world events.
Using forecasting data from the Good Judgment Project’s recent prediction
tournaments, we tested the change in predictability—including accuracy, confidence, and
difficulty—against the experimental constraints of diplomatic ties, rule of law, effective
democracy, trade dependence, and freedom of the press. Our hypothesis was that each of
these institutions, together and in conjunction with one another, would be effectively able to
constraint power player political behavior and reduce uncertainty in the geopolitical realm
We found that all of the constraints, except for diplomatic ties, actually had a negative
correlation with prediction accuracy. Democracy was the strongest negative correlation
between the level of constraint and prediction accuracy. We proposed that one possible
explanation for this result is due to a potential quadratic relationship between democracy
and predictability, such that countries who are transitioning from autocracy actually become
less predictable than those that are autocratic. Further research in a larger sample set is
needed to test this new hypothesis.
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Opportunities for Future Research
Beyond furthering the democracy hypothesis presented in the conclusion, there are
a number of other research projects that could follow this paper. As was mentioned
numerous times throughout this paper, the small and very particular sample of data used in
this analysis is sufficient for hypothesis generation but not true hypothesis testing. Future
research could be done to expand the validity of this study from the forecasting world into
the real world through a choice of parallel data points that form a part of empirical political
science research.
In addition, a number of additional variables could be incorporated into this analysis
to better understand the role that institutions can play in encouraging or diminishing
question predictability. Some suggestions on the individual forecaster level include
education background and cognitive/political science training to gain a better
understanding as to the knowledge base with which each forecaster is operating. Another
interesting study would be to test the time spent researching, collecting new information,
and updating each forecast as a measure of how well the forecaster understands the complex
power dynamics taking place. These variables, though harder to measure, would add a
significant component to the study of predictability based on specific question details.
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